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This paper considers whether countries might mutually agree a policy of open borders, allowing free
movement of workers across countries. For the countries to agree, the short run costs must outweighed by
the long term beneﬁts that result from better labor market ﬂexibility and income smoothing. We show that
such policies are less likely to be adopted when workers are less risk averse workers and when countries
trade more. More surprisingly, we ﬁnd that some congestion costs can help. This reverses the conventional
wisdom that congestion costs tend to inhibit free migration policies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since its beginnings, the European Union has aimed at implementing free movement of workers
between member states, Subsequent enlargement of the E.U. has raised the issue further up the
agenda. Whereas the beneﬁt of a policy of free movement of workers may seem obvious to many
economists and economic advisers, some member states have been reluctant implement the policy,
either implementing the policy in stages or applying different standards of implementation, or in some
cases applying policies as restrictive as for non-EU immigrants.1 The main reason of this reluctance
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1 Clemens et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the gain from migration is large. They ﬁnd that the gain from a migrant of moderate
skill from a median country moving to the U.S. is around $10,000 per year. They attribute this large gain as due to policy
barriers to labor mobility. Klein and Ventura (2009) ﬁnd similarly large gains from removing barriers to international
labor mobility which are of an order of magnitude greater than the gains from capital mobility.
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lies in the fear that inﬂows of migrant workers may depress local labor market conditions and the
welfare of the host country workers.2
In this paper, we discuss the decision of countries to open their borders to workers and adopt
policies of unconditional or uncontrolled movements of workers. Free movement of workers and
labor market integration, as well as product market integration, has been a regular topic on the agenda
of the socio-economic projects of both the E.U. and N.A.F.T.A. The topic has featured in discussions
about the assent of new member states to the E.U. and in the assessment of Mexican migration to
the U.S. In this paper, we consider that countries implement a policy of free movement of workers
only if it is sustainable or self-enforcing. That is, each country should be better-off with the policy at
each point in time taking into account any short run costs and long term future beneﬁts. We present
a model where migrants impose a negative externality on locals through increased congestion of
local factors (e.g. land, local resources, local capital, etc.) or through adverse changes in the terms
of trade. However by agreeing on a policy of free movement of labor a country may increase the
future expected utility of its citizens because it allows its labor force to reallocate in response to future
productivity shocks and therefore beneﬁt from improved labor market ﬂexibility. In addition, risk
averse workers beneﬁt from better income smoothing under the policy of free movement of labor.
We develop a two-country trade model where individuals consume both a local non-traded good
and two traded goods: one produced locally and one produced abroad. We assume Cobb-Douglas
preferences, so goods are imperfect substitutes with a unit elasticity of substitution. Workers inelasti-
cally supply one unit of labor in the production sectors of their country of residence. Production is
subject to decreasing returns to scale (congestion) and country speciﬁc productivity shocks. With a
policy of free movement of workers, individuals are free to move and reside in the country where
they ﬁnd an employment contract. We ﬁrst analyze the short run equilibrium under this policy and
discuss the resulting efﬁciency in the labor market. We show that a policy of free movement of
workers yields an excess agglomeration of the labor force in the high productivity country except
in speciﬁc cases. This excess agglomeration occurs because migrating workers do not internalize
2 In April 2011, such a fear has enticed France to threaten to suspend its obligation to the E.U. freedom of movement
(Schengen Treaty) because of the threat of abnormal ﬂow of migrants from Italy. See for instance The Telegraph, 22
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the effect of their move on the productivity and consumption basket of local workers. In our model,
there is no excess agglomeration only in three speciﬁc cases: when all goods are traded, when
no goods are traded and when the production function displays inﬁnitely decreasing to scale (full
congestion). In all other cases, the local workers in the higher productivity country incurs a short
run cost from uncontrolled inﬂows of workers. Interestingly this cost is highest when the production
process displays no congestion effect (constant returns to scale) and each country trades a signiﬁcant
share of its total production. The cost therefore, mainly stems from the adverse change in the terms of
trade. Note that the presence of trade effects qualiﬁes the common idea that international workers
movements have no effect on natives in closed economies that produce under constant returns to scale
(or where capital perfectly adapts to the labor inﬂow). The inﬂows of workers may have no impact on
wages, but have adverse effect on the relative import prices and the consumption basket of domestic
workers. As presented above, the policies of free movement of workers are a concern for economies
such as Europe and North America that have signiﬁcant trade and labor mobility. So, one should not
neglect the impact of trade on migration incentives and on the adoption of migration policies.
We then discuss the dynamic trade-off between the short cost of the policy of free movement of
workers and its long run beneﬁt in terms of labor market ﬂexibility and insurance. Because free
movement of workers has the effect of unifying the two countries’ labor markets, workers beneﬁt from
better job opportunities. In addition, a policy of free movement of workers frees the individuals (and
their descendants) from economically depressed areas and allows them to smooth their consumption
by relocating to more productive regions. We set up a dynamic model where, under free movement of
workers, individuals freely choose their work location in each time period. Free movement of workers
becomes a sustainable common policy if and only if no country ﬁnds it optimal to breach the policy
by blocking inﬂows of workers or not renewing the foreign workers’ work permits. Unsurprisingly,
we show that the common policy is more sustainable if individuals and governments become more
patient. More interestingly, we show that the common policy becomes less sustainable when the
countries trade more goods. This is because the terms of trade partly absorbs productivity differences
and diminish the beneﬁt of labor market ﬂexibility. We also show that reductions of congestion effects
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congestion effects are important (i.e. strong decreasing returns to scale), a reduction in congestion
diminishes the negative impact of the inﬂows of international workers on local wages and makes
the policy more likely to be sustained. By contrast, when congestion effects are weak (i.e. weak
decreasing returns to scale), local wages respond too weakly to inﬂows of international workers and
become bad signals for immigrants. The resulting excessive agglomeration of the labor force in
high productivity countries may be too high a short run cost for natives to pay making the policy of
free movement unsustainable. Finally, we show that free movement of workers is more likely to be
implemented when individuals are more risk averse. In this case, free movement of workers smoothes
individual income and plays the role of an insurance scheme. Therefore more risk averse workers are
more likely to support international labor mobility.
In this paper we also make a distinction between uncontrolled movement of workers that uncon-
ditionally grant work permits and uncontrolled migration policies that grant citizenship rights to
incoming workers. Article 45 of the Lisbon Treaty sets out E.U. labor movement policy. It speciﬁes
that individuals who qualify for “worker” status shall unconditionally get permission to work through-
out the E.U. while retaining their native citizenship rights. Similarly, in the N.A.F.T.A., TN status
offers work permits to workers (typically Canadians) but not U.S. nationality and all its associated
rights. Under such a policy, immigrants are not formally part of the electoral constituencies of the
host country and may regularly need to renew their work permits. A more challenging policy would
therefore be a full right migration policy that unconditionally grants full citizenship rights and duties
to all migrants. We analyze this policy and compare it to that of free movement of workers. We show
that the full right migration policies are less likely to be adopted and sustained. For some parameter
values, such policies are never adopted if countries unconditionally offer citizenship rights to migrants.
This helps explain why uncontrolled movement of workers can be implemented in economies such
as the E.U., whereas policies that grant full citizenship rights generally remain controlled by strict
migration conditions and quotas.
Related literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First it relates to the literature emphasizes that
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weighing any current losses from the policy against possible future expected gains (See e.g. Acemoglu
et al. 2010, Chari and Kehoe 1990). Our analysis also relates to Thomas and Worrall (1988) who
discuss self-enforcing insurance mechanisms.3 The present paper differs however in two regards
from this literature. First the motivation for exchange comes from labor ﬂexibility and the potential
beneﬁcial effects of the mobility of workers. Such gains from ﬂexibility help countries offset the short
term cost of inﬂows of international workers by the longer term expected future beneﬁts. Secondly,
the present paper focuses on the adoption of market based policies rather than ﬁrst-best policies. That
is we shall suppose that governments do not have the ability to ﬁnely control the international labor
movement decisions but can either opt for free movement or no movement of labor. Thus with free
movement of labor the allocation is determined by individual migration decisions and market forces
and is not in the direct control of government. This not only makes our discussion more realistic in
the case of the E.U. integration but it also signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the analysis and adds the potential
externality of migrants on local workers. Indeed, each migrant does not internalize the effect of his/her
migration decision to on domestic and foreign wages and the terms of trade.
It also relates to the literature which analyzes the effect of migrants on the welfare of local workers.
The empirical relevance of the wage impact of migration is a much debated issue (see e.g. Borjas
2003, Borjas et al. 1996, Card 1990, Ottaviano and Peri 2005). Broadly speaking, the literature
suggests that competition from foreigners is likely to harm workers, especially those at the bottom
end of the income scale.4 By presenting a general equilibrium model where labor movements can
have a negative or a zero short run impact on local welfare, we claim to capture the empirical facts.
3 Empirical applications of informal insurance theory have primarily focused on individual relationships within villages
in less developed country (Ligon et al. 2002).
4 In fact, the empirical literature on the effect of migration on local labor markets does not reach a clear consensus. As
a case in point, early studies could not conﬁrm strong and signiﬁcant long-run effects of immigration on local wages
(Borjas et al. 1996, Card 1990). While it was admitted that most of the economic gain from migration accrues to the
migrants (Boeri and Brücker 2005), the impact of worker’s conditions in the receiving countries has been more debated
(Faini et al. 1999). Because the above studies were not concerned with the crowding out of natives by immigrant workers,
which potentially eliminated any wage effects (Filer 1992), researchers have been tempted to avoid spatial studies of
localized labor inﬂows and have preferred to consider the impact on the entire labor market. For example, the 1980 Cuban
immigration may have been important in Miami but small for the whole U.S. labor market. Under such a strategy, Borjas
(2003) measured signiﬁcant and negative effects of immigration on U.S. wages, harming more importantly the low skilled.
Ottaviano and Peri (2005) recently analyzed the effect of migration by modeling labor as a differentiated input in general
equilibrium. Those authors found negative partial effect of immigrants on natives within the same group of workers but
with signiﬁcantly mitigated effects on the overall economy. See Okkerse (2008) for an extensive summary.SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 6
However, for the sake of analytical tractability, our neoclassical analysis of the labor market focuses
on the benchmark case of homogenous workers. As a result, the interpretation of our results must
probably be restricted to the situations where governments weigh most heavily the welfare of low
skilled workers, either because of distributional concerns or because of the weight of low skilled
workers in the political decision making process (perhaps along median voter lines).
Our discussion is nevertheless driven by a general concern about public opinion in many democratic
countries, which appear relatively hostile to immigration.5 As reported by Scheve and Slaughter
(2001), Chiswick and Hatton (2003) and Mayda (2006), public opinion in democratic countries has
been far more anti-immigrant than has public policy in recent decades.6 Our discussion anchors
to this negative attitude towards immigration and focuses on the willingness to implement free
movement of labor with other states and countries. In our discussion the motivation of this attitude
is rooted in individuals’ anticipations of labor markets rather than in possible (mis-)perceptions
of multiculturalism or criminality. Our analysis of the acceptability of free movement of workers
becomes even more relevant in the E.U. because of recent suspicions of a “race to the top” in the
migration policies of the E.U. member states particularly in respect of the new member countries
(Kvist 2004). Whereas E.U. member states recently opened their borders to labor, many seemed to
strengthen their migration requirements. The current paper offers a possible explanation for this issue.
The paper also relates to a strand of the international trade literature concerned with the relationship
between trade and migration. This literature has indeed investigated the substitution between trade
and migration policies and the complementarity between movements of goods and workers. In the
Heckscher-Ohlin framework, trade and migration are substitute in the sense that they have the same
impact on prices (Mundell 1957). In its simplest version with symmetric country productivities, this
framework leads to factor price equalization and therefore eliminates any incentives for migration. So,
movements of workers must stem from exogenous asymmetries. When the framework is enriched with
5 The number of citizens stating that there are “too many” immigrants is 77% in the U.S., 67% in France, 78% in the
U.K. (Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2007). In Australia, his number rose for 16% to 68% during the period 1961-1988. In
many democratic countries the support for anti-immigration political parties is not negligible (e.g. the extreme right in the
second tours of French Presidential Election in 1974 and 2002).
6 This puzzle can be explained by the presence of industry interest groups and by the existence of an election bias due to
voters’ participation incentives (Facchini and Mayda 2008, Mayda 2006, Müller and Tai 2009).SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 7
productivity differences, movements of workers and commodities can be shown to be complements
as they vary in the same direction after positive productivity shocks (Markusen 1983). Such a shock
leads one country to increase its exports, which raises domestic wages and attracts more immigrants.7
Our model follows this track and presents a simple and analytically tractable Ricardo-Viner model
that includes two countries, two tradeable goods, three factors (labor and two country speciﬁc factors)
in addition to productivity shocks. It reproduces the complementarity between the movements of
workers and goods mentioned above: in the sense that productivity shocks stimulate both exports
and immigration. It is important to note that our model also reproduces the fact that the policies of
free movement of workers and goods are substitutes. Both trade and free migration policies reduce
the effect of productivity shocks on labor market inefﬁciencies and income ﬂuctuations. Indeed, the
impact of productivity differences on individual consumption is reduced not only by the relocation of
workers but also by the change in the terms of trade. As a main consequence, countries are more likely
to reject a policy of free movement of workers if they trade more. This gives an possible explanation
for why E.U. member states become more reluctant to free the movement of their workers as soon as
their trade barriers have been removed. Those countries may simply expect that the terms of trade
will attenuate income discrepancies and they do not expect that future gains from migration outweigh
the current loss of an increased congestion of local factors.8
The paper is also related to the political economy literature that considers the dynamic trade-offs in
migration policy acceptability. For instance, Dolmas and Huffman (2004) show that the number of
voters supporting immigration rises when immigrants are denied voting rights. Ortega (2010) shows
that, in the presence of upward social mobility, unskilled workers may favor the immigration of low
skilled foreigners to sustain their future majority and thereby advantages from income redistribution.
This literature focuses on the domestic beneﬁts from a controlled immigration from an outside world
(typically, an inﬁnite supply of immigrants) whereas our paper concentrates on the mutual beneﬁts
7 Several authors have qualiﬁed and extended these results. See e.g. Neary (1995) and Schiff (2006).
8 The idea of substitution between trade and migration is also conveyed by policy makers. For instance, the German
foreign affairs minister, Mr Kenkel, set a priority to open trade to Eastern European countries as a means to alleviate
the migration threat caused by the collapse of Eastern European regimes (Financial Times, 24 March 1994). Similarly,
promoting the N.A.F.T.A. agreement, the Mexican President Salinas stated in 1991 free trade means “more jobs ...[and]
higher wages in Mexico, and this in turn will mean fewer migrants to the United States and Canada. We want to export
goods, not people.” (Martin 2010; p.7).SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 8
that a group of countries ﬁnd in sharing their labor markets through an uncontrolled immigration
policy. In addition, this literature generally does not consider the impact of trade on the adoption of
migration policies. In our opinion, our setup seems more appropriate to discuss the ﬂexibility and
insurance motivations of policies favoring free movement of workers within the E.U. or N.A.F.T.A.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature about regional risk sharing (Asdrubali et al. 1996).
The present paper indeed suggests that the beneﬁt of sharing local productivity risks is an important
factor in the decision to adopt the common policy of free movement of workers. The policy allows
individuals to diversify their human capital risk by letting them choose the most productive location. In
theory, individuals could also diversify their risk by buying short diversiﬁed portfolios of international
assets. However, this strategy is not followed by workers (in particular those with low and average
incomes) who are often credit constrained and who mainly invest in their domestic housing market
and stock markets (French and Poterba 1991). For this reason the present paper abstracts from the
possibility of asset diversiﬁcation.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2 while Section 3 derives and
discusses the short run equilibrium. Section 4 discusses sustainable policies of free movement of
workers that grant work permits to moving workers. Section 5 extends those policies to immigration
policies that grant citizenship rights to moving workers. Section 6 studies some important extensions
to permanent productivity differences and to countries with unemployment. The last section concludes.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a two-country model in which a domestic country produces a tradeable good X and
a local non-tradeable good Z. The foreign country produces another tradeable good X and local
non-tradeable good Z. Consumer’s preferences for goods are given by the utility function U(C)
where U is an increasing and concave function and where C is a Cobb-Douglas composite good
C  KXg=2(X)g=2Z1 g and K is a constant. The parameter g 2 [0;1] expresses the preferences for
tradeable goods as well as their share in the whole economy.9 In this paper, we use the parameter g to
discuss the importance of trade between countries. For instance, when g = 0, consumers demand only
9 For the sake of simplicity, we assume symmetric trade preferences (g=2;g=2). Results are qualitatively the same for
asymmetric trade preferences (g=2;g=2).SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 9
the local non-traded good Z; there is no trade. When g = 1, consumers demand only the traded goods;
all goods are traded. The former case is generally assumed in the migration literature while the latter
is analyzed in the international trade literature about movements of factors and goods. Our model
attempts to make a link between the two literatures.
The domestic country has L worker-consumers and the foreign country L where L+L = ¯ L>0 and
¯ L ﬁnite. For the sake of analytical tractability we assume that labor is homogeneous. Each individual
inelastically supplies one unit of labor. In the domestic (foreign) country, LX (L
X) individuals work in
the tradeable good sector while LZ (L
Z) are employed in the local non-tradeable good sector. Workers
freely move between sectors and are thus paid the same wage w (w) in each sector.
Each tradeable and non-tradeable sector includes a unit mass of ﬁrms that produce according to
a production function Fi(Li) = aL
b
i , i 2 fX;Zg, where Li is the ﬁrm’s labor and where a > 0 and
ﬁnite, and b 2 (0;1] denote two parameters for productivity and congestion, which we assume to be
identical across ﬁrms and sectors for the sake of simplicity. The same production function applies to
the foreign country with a productivity parameter a > 0 (though with b common across countries).
For b < 1 the ﬁrm’s marginal product F0
i (Li) = abL
b 1
i decreases with the size of the labor force Li.
Production displays constant returns to scale or no congestion if b = 1. In this case, each worker’s
marginal productivity (and wage) remains constant whatever the size of the domestic production and
labor force. By contrast, production displays decreasing returns to scale or congestion if b < 1. In the
limit, b ! 0, there is full congestion and output is equal to a, which is independent of the size of the
labor force. In this case, production can be interpreted as a crop of ﬁxed size a.
We here make two remarks about the congestion assumption. First, the congestion force can be
interpreted either at a ﬁrm or sector level. At a ﬁrm level, each ﬁrm, which hires Li workers, can
be thought of holding a unit of local indivisible capital, which embeds either natural resources like
land or water or local human resources like local human capital, entrepreneurial skills, etc. At the
sector level decreasing returns to scale can be interpreted as the sharing of common infrastructures,
resources and land. In this case, the production function Fi(Li) applies to each sector i 2 fX;Zg
with Li being the sector employment and then each ﬁrm can be interpreted as experiencing a sector
speciﬁc productivity gi = F0
i (Li) = abL
b 1
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(b = 1) as a case where production involves capital and labor and where capital is instantaneously
and elastically supplied.10 As commonly argued, migration may have no effect on wages when
ﬁrms’ capital demand is not ﬁxed. However, Section 3 shows that the absence of congestion does
not eliminate the possibility of short-run an excess agglomeration of the work force in the high
productivity country. Moreover, in a dynamic setting like the one we will develop in Section 4,
capital is likely to be allocated in the time period before the realization of productivity shocks. The
production function therefore displays decreasing returns to scale in the short-run and labor demand
is downward sloping. Hamermesh (1993) provides ample empirical evidence about such downward
sloping labor demand functions at the ﬁrm and sector levels while Borjas (2003) presents evidence at
the country level. The fact that international labor movements impact on local wages is crucial for a
possible public reluctance to uncontrolled movements of workers. Finally, we assume initially that
there is no trade friction and no price rigidity in either the labor or product markets.11 For simplicity
we assume that proﬁts are redistributed to local individuals.
3. SHORT RUN EQUILIBRIUM
We now determine the short run equilibrium where individuals consider just current payoffs in their
decisions to move to another country. For the sake of conciseness, we characterize the variables for
the domestic country, those for the foreign country being symmetric. We ﬁrst establish the equilibrium
for immobile labor, then we characterize and discuss the equilibrium under free movement of worker
and ﬁnally we discuss the issue of excess migration.
Market equilibrium Let us ﬁrst suppose that labor is not allowed to move between countries. The
equilibrium consists of a set of prices, wages, income and sectorial labor distribution that satisfy
both proﬁt maximization and market clearing conditions for labor and goods. The solution of the
model is standard and detailed in Appendix A. Firms hire workers so that their marginal product
of labor equates wages: PiF0
i (Li)  PiabL
b 1
i = w. Under iso-elastic labor demand, their sales and
proﬁts are proportional to the wage bill so that PiFi(Li) = wLi=b. Because production functions are
10 For instance, under Cobb-Douglas production function of labor and capital, capital is proportional to labor and the
marginal product of labor is constant under the optimal demand of capital.
11 The assumption is relaxed in Section 6.2.SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 11
similar across sectors, labor allocates across the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors according to their
respective product demands: LX = gL and LZ = (1 g)L. When the markets of the tradeable goods
clear, the terms of trade adjust to balance the values of exports and imports. As consequence, one can
show that wages adjust so that
(1) w=w = L=L:
This shows that the relative wage rate adjusts to changes in the allocation of labor between countries.
The individual consumption in each country is given by the equilibrium consumption of the
composite goodC =(PX) g=2(P
X) g=2(PZ)g 1Y=L, where the constant K deﬁned above is normalized
so that the constant terms multiplying this expression are canceled out. GivenY=L = b 1w, and using
the prices in wage units computed above, we have
(2) C(L) = A

L
L
bg=2
Lb 1;
where A = a(a=a)g=2. A symmetric expression holds for individual consumption in the foreign
country:
C(L) =

a
a
(1 g)
C(¯ L L):
Individual consumption and migration respond to congestion and trade in the following ways. First,
when there is no congestion (b =1), individual consumption isC(L)=A(L=L)g=2, which declines as
more labor is allocated to the home country. This fall in consumption occurs because the relative wage
rate declines and foreign traded goods become relatively less expensive (see equation (1)). When
there exists some congestion (b < 1), a greater labor supply also leads to lower real wages making
home products also relatively more expensive. Second, when congestion is very important (b ! 0),
individual consumption isC(L) = AL 1, which inversely depends on the local labor supply. This case
corresponds to a situation where local workers evenly share a ﬁxed crop that depends only on the
productivity parameters. Workers are nevertheless able to exchange a part of their crop so that their
ﬁnal consumption is diversiﬁed and is proportional to the compound shock A rather than their ownSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 12
shock a. Third, when no goods are traded (g = 0), individual consumption is C(L) = aLb 1, which
depends only on local labor and local productivity. This conﬁguration corresponds to a situation
where local workers equally share a production factor that is subject to congestion. Finally, when all
goods are traded (g = 1), individual consumption is the same in both countries, C(L) =C(¯ L L).
Exogenous productivity differentials (a=a) are fully absorbed by changes in the terms of trade so
that labor mobility between counties will confer no beneﬁts.
Free movement of workers Now suppose that both countries adopt the policy of free movement
of workers. We assume that workers incur no moving costs in changing location. This assumption of
zero moving costs is largely for simplicity and in Appendix B we show that a simple model where
moving costs are heterogeneous across workers can replicate the same equilibrium outcome provided
some workers have zero moving costs and provided average moving costs are not too high.12 Under a
policy of free movement and with zero moving costs, workers will move until individual utilities and
therefore individual consumptions are equalized between countries: C(L) =C(L). If productivity
is higher in the home country (a > a) and g < 1, then the free movement of workers implies that
C(L) <C(¯ L L) since (a=a)(1 g) < 1. As C(L) is decreasing, we have therefore that L > ¯ L L or
L > ¯ L=2 > L so that workers relocate to the more productive country. In the present Cobb-Douglas
setting, free movement of workers yields a unique equilibrium for the allocation of workers between
countries. The labor allocation satisﬁes
(3)
ˆ L
ˆ L
=

a
a
 1 g
1 b(1 g)
;
where the hat ˆ denotes the short run equilibrium outcome under free movement of workers. One
can check that d(ˆ L=ˆ L)=d(a=a) > 0, while d(ˆ L=ˆ L)=db < 0 and d(ˆ L=ˆ L)=dg > 0 if a > a. As
expected, workers move into the most productive country because the latter offers higher wages.
However, the equilibrium number of immigrants in the most productive country decreases with the
intensity of local congestion and the share of tradeable goods.
12 Although we later introduce a dynamic element for public policy on labor mobility our model of individual decision
making is entirely static. For a model where the migration decision is dynamic and based on the migrant learning the
wage distribution in the foreign country, see Kennan and Walker (2011).SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 13
Congestion and trade have the following impact on the distribution of labor. When local factor
congestion rises (smaller b) the reallocation of labor in response to productivity differences becomes
smaller because changes in labor have a greater impact on reducing local wages and consumption:
local congestion diminishes productivity gains and wage differentials and therefore the incentives
to move to another country. A larger share of the tradeable sector in the economy augments the
impact that the terms of trade have on earnings and consumption. Immigrants arriving in the higher
productivity country earn higher wages and this increases their demand for the goods produced in
their country of origin. As a result, wages rise in the country of origin and the incentives to move in
the foreign labor market are mitigated. The effect of the terms of trade is particularly noticeable when
all goods are tradeable (g ! 1). In this case, condition (3) implies that individuals spread equally
across countries so that the terms of trade fully absorb any exogenous productivity difference. Perfect
labor mobility needs then to adjust only for the differences stemming from local factor congestion.
Since countries are assumed to have the same congestion parameter b, it follows naturally that the
equilibrium labor allocation is symmetric. When some goods are not traded (g < 1), the terms of trade
do not fully absorb productivity differences and more individuals locate in the country with the higher
productivity. As pointed out by Mundell (1957), the labor reallocation in response to productivity
differences is smaller the more open is the economy (larger g) because trade and labor mobility are
substitutes.
Welfare It is instructive to consider the welfare consequences of policies promoting free movement
of workers. For simplicity, we focus on the case of a world utilitarian planner who assigns individuals’
residence and is able to redistribute income through lump sum transfers. To highlight the effect of
labor market ﬂexibility we sterilize the possible risk sharing effects by supposing workers are risk
neutral,U(C) =C. The planner maximizes world per-capita welfare
W(L) = w(L)C(L)+(1 w(L))C(L);SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 14
where w(L) = L=¯ L is the proportion of the population allocated to the home country. It is interesting
to ask whether the social planner allocates more labor to the high productivity country and if so
whether the planner allocates more or less labor than at the free labor mobility outcome.
Under free movement of workers, we haveC(ˆ L) =C(ˆ L) so that the marginal per-capita welfare is
(see computation in Appendix C)
W0(ˆ L) =
bg
2
C(ˆ L)
¯ L
 ˆ L
ˆ L
 
ˆ L
ˆ L

:
From the above discussion we know that the home country has a larger share of labor in equilibrium
when it has higher productivity (a > a () ˆ L > ˆ L). This implies that W0(ˆ L) < 0 if b 6= 0 and
g 6= 0 and if ˆ L 6= ˆ L, which happens only for g 6= 1. Likewise W0(ˆ L) > 0 if a < a. Therefore, the
planner prefers less labor dispersion and prefers to restrict the movement of workers, except in three
polar cases: full congestion (b ! 0), no trade (g = 0) and full trade (g = 1).
Likewise we can check whether the social planner prefers to allocate more labor to the more
productive country. Since at L = ¯ L=2,C(¯ L=2)=C(¯ L=2) = (a=a)(1 g), we have
W0(¯ L=2) = b(1 g)
C(¯ L=2)
¯ L
"
1 

a
a
(1 g)#
:
For a > a we have W0(¯ L=2) > 0 and likewise W0(¯ L=2) < 0 for a < a. Therefore, unless g = 1,
the planner will always prefer to allocate more labor to the more productive country but not as much
as allocated at the free labor mobility equilibrium.
We summarize this result in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: The policy of free movement of workers yields excessive agglomeration of workers
in the high productivity country compared to the utilitarian optimal spatial distribution of risk neutral
workers provided there is weak congestion and both tradeable and non-tradeable goods.
This proposition highlights a well-know externality in location decisions. When a worker decides
to relocate to another country, he/she considers only the average or per capita consumption in eachSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 15
country and does not take into account his/her impact on reducing consumption in the destination
country or raising it in the origin country. The planner weighs not only the change in the per capita
consumption of the marginal migrant but also the effect on the consumption of all workers in the
origin and destination countries. To clarify this issue, consider the effect of a worker moving from the
foreign to the home country. This move reduces labor supply in the foreign country and increases it at
home. Differentiating (2), one readily checks that the consumption of workers residing in the home
country fall by  LC0(L) = (1 b)C(L)+(bg=2)C(L)+(bg=2)(L=L)C(L). In this expression, the
ﬁrst term relates to the wage reduction caused by increased congestion, the second to the fall in export
revenues due to the lower relative export price and the last to the loss in consumption due to the higher
relative import prices. Similarly, workers in the origin country have a rise in their consumption given
by LC0(L)=(1 b)C(L)+(bg=2)C(L)+(bg=2)(L=L)C(L), which reﬂects the exact opposite
effects. From these expressions it can be seen that the externality works mainly through the effect of
trade. When no trade occurs (g = 0) the fall and rise in consumptions exactly offset each other at the
equilibrium whereC(L) =C(L). The planner will therefore choose the allocation that corresponds
to that equilibrium. However, when countries trade (g > 0), the last terms in each expression do not
cancel out in any non-symmetric equilibrium (L > L). In particular, the loss in consumption due to
higher relative import prices in the destination country will be larger than the rise in consumption
caused by lower relative import prices in the origin country. The planner will then prefer to allocate
fewer workers to the destination country. This effect of the movement of workers on the terms of
trade and workers’ welfare is generally overlooked in the traditional migration literature. However, it
may be non-negligible in the case of economic unions where trade and migration potential (or threat)
are important and where free labor movement policies are under discussion or being implemented.
To measure the excess agglomeration of workers we deﬁne an excess agglomeration index e 
(ˆ L=ˆ L)=(˜ L=˜ L) where (˜ L; ˜ L) is the planner’s labor allocation that solvesW0(˜ L) = 0 (see Appendix
C). Figure 1 plots the value of excess agglomeration index e in the space of congestion and trade
parameters (b;g). The ﬁgure conﬁrms that there is no excess agglomeration in the three following
special cases. First, when all goods are traded (g = 1), the terms of trade exactly absorb productivity
differences and eliminates any incentives to migrate. The welfare optimum naturally coincides withSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 16
the equilibrium. Second, when no goods are traded (g = 0), local workers evenly share a local
production factor that is subject to congestion. Wages then reﬂect local productivity and also the local
consumption of local goods. Wages fall when there is an inﬂow of workers and provide workers an
appropriate signal for their decisions to move. The equilibrium also exactly replicates the planner’s
outcome. Finally, when production is highly congestible (b ! 0), the economy approximates
a situation where local workers evenly share a ﬁxed crop that depends only on the productivity
parameters. The planner is indifferent to the location of workers because he/she can redistribute the
global crop (a +a) to risk neutral individuals through lump sum transfers. So, the equilibrium
simply coincides with the labor allocation that the planner chooses when she needs to make no
transfer. Wages and incomes are therefore also appropriate signals for location decisions. Note that
the migration literature often focuses on the above second case where labor ﬂows but products do
not. The omission of trade patterns is unfortunately not innocuous in the discussion of the E.U.
and N.A.F.T.A. integration processes. As some trade and some congestion are reasonably expected
features of any real economy, the free movement of workers is likely to yield excessive agglomeration
into the most productive country and generate short run costs for the country receiving migrants.
Figure 1 also shows that the excessive agglomeration of workers becomes more severe as b
rises. More formally, it can be shown that the equilibrium labor level ˆ L increases faster than the
planner’s level ˜ L as b rises. When local factor congestion is weaker, agglomeration in the higher
productivity country is more pronounced both in the free labor movement equilibrium and in the
planner’s allocation. The externality in the location decisions however exacerbates the agglomeration
process at the cost of reducing aggregate consumption. This is because, as b increases, equilibrium
wages become less elastic to the relocation of workers and do not give appropriate location incentives
to workers. Therefore, the agglomeration of workers becomes increasingly excessive for weaker local
factor congestion. As shown in Figure 1, the excessive agglomeration of workers can be strong. To
make this clear, a moderate expenditure on tradeable goods of g = 0:2 and a weak congestion factor
of b = 0:8 yield a population ratio ˆ L=ˆ L ' 4:6 and an excessive agglomeration e ' 2. This means that
the high productivity country gets 4:66 times larger than the low productivity country in equilibrium
whereas the planner would call for the more modest proportion of 2:33.SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 17
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FIGURE 1: LOCI OF EXCESSIVE AGGLOMERATION - (g;b)-SPACE
(a=a = 2, ¯ L = 1).
Figure 1 also shows that the impact of trade on excess of agglomeration is non-monotonic with
respect to the size of the tradeable sector. Excessive agglomeration increases with g for small g
while it decreases with it for large g. Therefore, the agglomeration of workers is most excessive for
intermediate shares of trade. At the extremes, we have that W0(ˆ L) = 0 if g = 0 whereas W0(ˆ L) =
W0(¯ L=2) = 0 if g = 1. So, the welfare optimum and the equilibrium allocation coincide for those
two parameter values. Hence, we expect that the agglomeration of workers becomes more inefﬁcient
when g lies between those two bounds
As a result, the excessive agglomeration of workers culminates when production faces weak
congestion and each country trades a small share of its production. In particular, the more productiveSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 18
country attracts too many migrants when there exists no congestion or constant returns to scale. A
standard argument is that migration is innocuous under constant returns to scale because workers
move with both their constant productivity and consumption to the hosting country. However, in this
model with productivity differences, workers increase their productivity when they move to the more
productive country. As a result, they produce more of the good of the destination country, increase
congestion and depress its price and local wages. They also demand more of the good produced in
the low productivity country and increase its price. Native workers in the more productive country
therefore see their wage fall and the price of imports rise. A planner would prefer to reduce labor
movements to partly restore the wages and consumption levels of those in the more productive country.
Such a conclusion only applies where consumers purchase a mix of tradeable and non-tradeable
goods.
To sum up, policies promoting free movement of workers can lead to excessive agglomeration of
labor. Models with no trade, full trade and full congestion are not instructive about this effect.
4. SUSTAINABLE POLICIES FOR FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
We now study whether policies of free movement of workers will be adopted by the two countries.
In the previous section we highlighted the fact that high productivity countries may incur short run
costs as too many workers move there. In the long run, countries may face bad productivity shocks
and may use the option to let their natives move and work in another country. So, countries balance
the short run costs of accepting inﬂows of migrants in good states of nature and the long run beneﬁt
of allowing its population work in foreign countries in bad states.
To discuss this trade-off between costs and beneﬁts in the short and long run, we focus on a discrete
time dynamic model with an inﬁnite horizon. First, we assume that individuals are inﬁnitely lived
and have the same discount factor d 2 (0;1). Under this assumption agents can also be interpreted as
dynasties where each generation has an altruism coefﬁcient d. Second, we assume that countries are
hit by productivity shocks. In each period of time t, a state of nature s2S f1;:::;Sg determines the
domestic and foreign productivity (as;a
s ). States of nature are i.i.d. and have non-zero probability
ps where ås ps = 1. The operator Es[ ] denotes the expected value, i.e. Es[xs] = ås psxs. Note thatSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 19
because the states of nature are i.i.d., agents’ decisions depend only on the current state, so that we
can analyze all decisions in the current time period and to drop the reference to time. To highlight
the state dependence, we denote the consumption of a worker residing in the domestic and foreign
country by Cs(Ls) and C
s(Ls) while we denote the corresponding utility by us(Ls) =U[Cs(Ls)] and
u
s(Ls) =U[C
s(Ls)].
In this context, we deﬁne a policy of free movement of workers as the removal of any control
over the movement of workers between countries. More precisely, it is a common policy in which
both countries unconditionally grant non-permanent work permits to any workers who obtain a job
in their jurisdiction. As is typical of many actual migration policies, these non-permanent work
permits are automatically associated with non-permanent residence permits. In this section, we also
keep a distinction between, on the one hand, work permits and, on the other hand, citizenship and
the socioeconomic and political rights that are associated with it. This distinction is important for
two reasons. First, it ﬁxes the group of individuals that each government considers as its nationals
wherever they work and reside. When workers do not change citizenship or nationality, this group is
invariant to the possible relocation of labor between countries. Second, this distinction determines the
alternative policy of a country that does not adopt free movement of workers or that decides to breach
from this policy. In such cases, we assume that the opting out and breaching countries are able to
exert a control on the issue of work permits by putting restrictions and conditions on the number of
non-permanent work permits. As a result they are able to stop renewing existing work permits granted
to non-citizens and therefore to legally reduce the local labor supplies. We discuss this distinction
further in Section 5.
Many practical situations correspond to the above setting. Common policies allowing non-nations
to local labor markets are often embedded in third-country association agreements or guest worker
programs. Those agreements and programs permit the economic immigration of third-country
nationals into a host country under the control of quotas or individualized labor certiﬁcations. For
example, the E.U. had such agreements with many Eastern European countries during the 1990s and
still has such agreements with some neighboring countries including Turkey and Morocco. Hence,
our discussion relates to the E.U. decision to adopt a policy of free movement of workers with EasternSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 20
European countries in the 1990s or to the current debate about Turkey’s access to the E.U. labor market.
Our discussion may be relevant for the popular concerns about migration issues during the 2005
French referendum about the European Constitution. Similarly, N.A.F.T.A. includes policies in favor
of free movement of workers. In particular, the TN status grants the equivalent of a non-permanent
U.S. visa to Canadian and Mexican citizens who get the opportunity to work in each other’s countries.
The TN status is limited to three years and to for certain designated professional occupations but can
be renewed indeﬁnitely. In practice, the U.S. has implemented a different treatment for the access for
Canadians and Mexicans. Whereas the TN status has been easily granted to Canadians at the U.S.
border without quotas, it has been offered under stricter conditions to Mexican nationals who are
subject to control procedures and to quotas. So, the present discussion also relates to the U.S. and
Canadian decision to adopt a common uncontrolled mobility of their nationals within the N.A.F.T.A.
and to the U.S. and Mexican decision to remove the present controls and quotas on Mexicans. The
present discussion is also applicable to the extension of the TN status to other professional occupations
and other countries and in addition to the U.S. H1B visa or to the U.S. employment-based green cards,
etc.
We give each country two options: either to adopt the policy of free movement of workers or to
control the ﬂow of workers. However, when a country chooses the second option, it is unable to
alter the welfare of its natives working in the other country and it puts no weight on the immigrants
residing in its own jurisdiction. Hence, the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game in which
each country independently controls the inﬂow of workers within its borders is a situation where no
labor movements exist. The second option therefore reduces to the absence of movement of workers.
In order for the policy of free movement of workers to be adopted both countries must comply with
the policy. For the sake of exposition, citizenship is assumed to be evenly distributed across countries
initially so that each country has ¯ L=2 citizens. We shall assume that when a country does not adopt
the policy of free movement of workers or when it breaches the agreement about the free movement
of workers, both countries stop delivering work permits to non-citizen workers. In such a case, the
spatial distribution of workers is forced back to the initial distribution (¯ L=2; ¯ L=2). For simplicity,SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 21
we assume that once the agreement about the policy of free movement of workers is breached, it is
breached for ever, though this last assumption can be relaxed without qualitatively altering the results.
Under the policy of free movement of workers, individuals are free to relocate at no cost to any
country. Because individuals move freely, they get the same intertemporal utility in the next period
irrespectively of the location they choose in the current period. So, their current location decision
depends only on the current state s and labor spatial distribution ˆ Ls. As a result, in equilibrium, agents
locate so that they are indifferent between locations: us(Ls) = u
s(Ls) () Cs(Ls) =C
s(Ls). The
long run equilibrium coincides with the short run equilibrium given by (3) in the previous section.13
As we now deal only with the free movement outcome ˆ Ls and the initial allocation ¯ L=2, we drop the
“hat” and refer to the equilibrium allocation as Ls.
A policy of free movement of workers is sustainable if and only if each country’s government
evaluates that this policy is beneﬁcial to its citizens at each date and every possible state. That
is, a country will breach the policy if it ever ﬁnds it in its own interest to do so. As citizens are
homogeneous, each government compares the intertemporal utility of a representative citizen under
free labor mobility with his/her intertemporal utility in the absence of the policy. Consider some state
r 2 S. Free movement of workers implies a contemporaneous gain/loss relative to the alternative
at any date t of ur(Lr) ur(¯ L=2). As we have seen in the previous section, a country will incur a
contemporaneous loss if it becomes more productive (ar > a
r ) and must host an uncontrolled ﬂow of
immigrants. Free movement of worker will be adopted by countries if contemporaneous losses are
offset by future beneﬁts. Future beneﬁts will only arise if there are some future states q 2 S where
the country has relatively low productivity (aq < a
q). Since the equilibrium allocation of labor is
history independent, the expected future beneﬁts at any date t is equal to Es[us(Ls) us(¯ L=2)]. The
policy of free movement of workers will therefore only be sustainable if
(4) ur(Lr) ur(¯ L=2)+
d
1 d
Es[us(Ls) us(¯ L=2)]  0 8r 2 S:
13 Note that this property is valid only under free movement of workers. It is not valid under policies that control
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We refer to these conditions as participation or self-enforcement constraints. Condition (4) is most
stringent for the state(s) with the highest contemporaneous loss, s 2 argmaxrfur(¯ L=2) ur(Lr)g.
Similarly the equivalent of Condition (4) for the foreign country is more stringent in the state(s)
s 2 argmaxrfu
r(¯ L=2) u
r(Lr)g. Rewriting Condition (4), we can state that the policy of free
movement of workers is sustainable if and only if
(5)
us(Ls) us(¯ L=2)+
d
1 d
Es[us(Ls) us(¯ L=2)]  0;
u
s(Ls) u
s(¯ L=2)+
d
1 d
Es[u
s(Ls) u
s(¯ L=2)]  0:
These conditions lead to the following conclusions. First, sustainability is possible only if there are
positive future expected gains. This implies that countries should expect to incur negative productivity
shocks in the future. Second, because d=(1 d) is an increasing function [0;1] ! R+, policies
promoting free movement of workers are sustainable if discount factors are large enough. This is a
result reminiscent of the Folk Theorem in repeated games (Friedman 1971). Finally, by Condition (5),
sustainability is less likely if the probabilities of going to the states s and s are higher.
The next subsection discusses sustainability when the beneﬁt of free movement of workers stems
only from labor market ﬂexibility. The subsequent subsection introduces risk aversion.
4.1. Sustainability and labor market ﬂexibility
To highlight the beneﬁt of labor market ﬂexibility, we ﬁrst ignore any insurance motives by
supposing workers are risk neutral: us(Ls) = Cs(Ls). Also, to get insight about the impact of
trade and congestion factors on the adoption of policies of free movement of workers, we simplify
the model. Here we focus on a simple shock structure that permits analytical investigation. We
assume that countries face a two-state anti-correlated shocks where S = 2, a1 = a
2 = a > 1 and
a2 = a
1 = 1=a < 0 with p1 = p2 = 1=2. Hence the domestic country incurs a high productivity
shock in state 1 and a low productivity shock in state 2. The opposite occurs for the foreign country.
Countries have no common shocks so that there exists a clear beneﬁt to pool the labor markets.SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 23
Under free movement of workers, the equilibrium conditions imply equal consumption in both
states, Cs(Ls) =C
s(Ls), s 2 f1;2g, whereas the symmetry of productivity shocks imposes symmetric
employment and consumption levels across states: L1 = L
2 (= ¯ L L2) and C1(L1) =C
2(L2). There-
fore, consumption is identical in any country and state of nature: C1(L1)=C2(L2)=C
1(L1)=C
2(L2).
From equation (3) we have
L1 =
r2
1+r2 ¯ L and L2 = ¯ L L1 =
1
1+r2 ¯ L where r = a
1 g
1 b(1 g):
By contrast, a planner would maximize the ex-ante welfare
E[W] = å
s=1;2
ps[w(Ls)Cs(Ls)+(1 w(Ls))C
s(Ls)]
with respect to Ls, s = 1;2. As the maximization is state-wise, this is equivalent to maximizing the ex
post welfare
W(L) = w(L)C(L)+(1 w(L))C(L):
The optimal distribution of labor in the present dynamic setting corresponds to the utilitarian optimal
distribution of workers discussed in Proposition 1. As a result, free movement of workers leads to
excess agglomeration in the high productivity country when b 6= 0 and g = 2 f0;1g.
The domestic country has the most stringent participation constraint (5) in state 1, whereas the
foreign country has the exactly the same most stringent participation constraint (5) in state 2. Given
symmetry, the two conditions (5) are identical and simplify to
(6) G(a;b;g) 
d
2 d
;
where the function
G(a;b;g) 
C1(¯ L=2) C1(L1)
C2(L2) C2(¯ L=2)
measures the relative cost of adopting (the policy of) free movement of workers. The sustainability of
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G(a;b;g). The function G balances the short run cost of accepting foreign workers in the good state
(state 1 for the home country, state 2 for the foreign country) to the short run beneﬁt of the labor
movement option in the bad state (state 2 for the home country, state 1 for the foreign country). It
is possible that G > 1 so that the costs of accepting foreign workers in the good state exceed the
beneﬁts of labor movement in the bad state. Because d=(2 d) is an increasing function ranging
in the interval [0;1], the policy of free movement of workers is not sustainable when G > 1. When
G < 1 the policy of free movement of workers is more likely to be sustainable when the relative cost
of adopting the policy of free movement of workers falls. That is, when the short run cost of accepting
international workers falls or when the beneﬁt of labor mobility increases.
To consider the range of the function G it is instructive to begin with the discussion of the cases
where g and b are set to their extreme values. We start with the case where all goods are traded.
All trade When all goods are traded (g =1), it can be shown that G(a;b;1)=1. Because the terms
of trade fully absorb productivity differences, there is no incentive for workers to relocate and the
labor force remains evenly distributed. Trade is a perfect substitute for labor mobility. Free movement
of workers has no value and is not a sustainable policy for any discount factor.
No trade When no goods are traded (g = 0) the relative cost of adopting free movement of workers,
G(a;b;0) < 1: free movement of workers is therefore a sustainable policy provided that workers
and governments are sufﬁciently patient (high d). In the absence of trade, production efﬁciency
can only be restored through relocation of the labor force. To see this, let us ﬁrst check the case of
immobile labor. Per capita consumption is given by the domestic and foreign individual productivities
so that C1(L=2) = a(¯ L=2)b 1 andC2(¯ L=2) = a 1(¯ L=2)b 1. Workers’ consumption is again larger
in the domestic, high productivity country. Under the policy of free movement of workers, workers
move toward the high productivity country so that L
1=L1 = (1+a2(b 1)) < 1 and consumption is
C1(L1) = aL
b 1
1 . The short run cost of accepting free movement of workers is equal to a(¯ L=2)b 1 
aL
b 1
1 whereas the beneﬁt of labor mobility is equal to aL
b 1
1  a 1(¯ L=2)b 1. It can be shown that
this short run cost is smaller than the beneﬁt. Therefore, free movement of workers is a sustainableSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 25
policy if the discount factor d is high enough. Furthermore, it is easily checked that as local factor
congestion vanishes (b ! 1) the short run cost falls to zero while the net beneﬁts remain positive so
that G(a;b;0) tends to zero. As a result, free movement of workers is likely to be sustainable when
no goods are traded and congestion is weak enough.
Strong congestion Consider the case where ﬁrms face very strong decreasing returns to scale or
local factor congestion (b ! 0). Then, it can be shown that limb!0G(a;b;g) = 1. Free movement
of workers is therefore not a sustainable policy. In this case, each country randomly gets a crop of
size a or a 1 and trades a share of its crop to get an equal consumption of A+A 1 where A = a1 g.
In the absence of labor mobility consumption is 2A in the high productivity country and 2A 1 in the
low productivity country. Thus the short run cost of accepting migrants is 2A (A+A 1) = A A 1
whilst the short term beneﬁt is (A+A 1) 2A 1 = A A 1. Since the short run cost equals the
short term beneﬁt, impatient, risk-neutral workers in the high productivity country will never accept
incurring this short run cost for a possible beneﬁt of an equal amount in the future. The last two cases
highlight the fact that free movement of workers may not be an enforceable policy simply because of
the delays between costs and beneﬁts. As seen before, those cases indeed do not involve any excess
agglomeration of workers.
No congestion Suppose ﬁnally that there exists no local factor congestion but some trade occurs
(b = 1, g > 0). In this case it can be shown that G(a) = (a1 g  1)=(1 ag 1) 2 (1;a] and G
monotonically decreases from a to 1 as g rises from 0 to 1. As a result, free movement of workers is
not a sustainable policy. This can be seen as follows. In the absence of labor mobility, the domestic and
foreign individual consumption is given by the high and low productivities so thatC1(¯ L=2) = a1 g
andC2(¯ L=2) = ag 1. Workers’ consumption is of course larger in the high productivity country so
that workers have incentives to move to the high productivity country under free movement of workers.
Nevertheless, because there exists a demand for the good produced in the low productivity country
(g > 0), there still exists a demand for labor in that country and workers never fully agglomerate
in the high productivity country. In equilibrium, labor is allocated so that L=L = a2(1 g)=g andSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 26
workers’ consumption is given by C1(L1) = a1 g(L=L) g=2 = 1. Comparing this to consumption in
the absence of labor mobility, we observe that the short run cost of accepting migrants is then equal
to a1 g  1 whereas the beneﬁt of labor mobility is equal to 1 ag 1. Because a1 g +ag 1 > 2
provided a > 1, this short run cost is larger than the beneﬁt. Thus the high productivity country never
ﬁnds it proﬁtable to accept migrants in exchange of the promise of a possible outﬂow of its natives in
a future bad state of nature. This is a remarkable result given the common claim that migration is
irrelevant in a world with constant returns to scale because workers move with both their demand
and production capabilities. However, we have shown in the previous section that there exists excess
agglomeration of workers in the high productivity country even under constant returns to scale. This
effect increases both the short run cost and beneﬁt of migration. Yet, because of the presence of
inefﬁciencies, it increases the short run cost of migration more than its beneﬁt and hence weakens the
sustainability of a policy of free movement of labor.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that individuals are risk neutral and that countries face a two-state
anti-correlated shocks. Free movement of workers is never a sustainable policy in an economy with
only tradeable goods (g = 1) or with either very low or very high congestion costs (b 2 f0;1g). In
an economy where no goods are tradeable (g = 0), free movement of workers becomes a sustainable
policy if and only if individuals are sufﬁciently patient (high d).
The four cases discussed above suggest that free movement of workers is less likely to be a
sustainable policy in economies with large trade and high congestion of local factors. Figure 2 depicts,
for all congestion and trade parameters (b;g), the locus of the equality G(2;b;g) = d=(2 d) where
d=(2 d) = 0:25, 0:50, 0:75 and 1. These values respectively correspond to critical discount factors
d = 0:40, 0:66, 0:85 and 1. The area (a) corresponds to the situation where G(2;b;g) > 1 and the
areas (b) and (c) to the situation where G(2;b;g) < 1. The relative cost of adopting free movement
of workers G(2;b;g) becomes larger as we move to the North-West of the ﬁgure. As a result, free
movement of workers is more likely to become a sustainable policy in economies with smaller local
factor congestion and lower trade.
Finally, Figure 2 also shows that the relative cost of adopting free movement of workers, G,
increases as more goods are traded (larger g). Because trade is a substitute for labor movement,SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 27
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FIGURE 2: RELATIVE COST OF ADOPTING THE FREE LABOR MOBILITY
POLICY - G(2;b;g).
free movement of workers is less useful when trade is large. On the other hand, the relative cost
of adopting free movement of workers, G(2;b;g), is not monotone with respect to the intensity
of congestion parameter b. Indeed, as we move downward in Figure 2 (b falls), G(2;b;g) ﬁrstly
decreases when the parameters (b;g) lie in the area (b) but it increases when those parameters lie in
the area (c). In the ﬁgure, areas (b) and (c) are separated by a thicker curve which corresponds to the
locus where the partial derivative Gb = ¶G(2;b;g)=¶b = 0. This locus therefore shows, for a given
g, the value of b for which free movement of workers can be supported for the lowest discount factor.
Whereas lower congestion or decreasing returns to scale implies that domestic workers’ productivity
and wages are less affected by the inﬂow of international workers, it also implies that the incentiveSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 28
for migration is not offset enough by any upward pressure on wages in the low productivity country.
Excessive agglomeration of labor occurs and can be so inefﬁcient that the domestic country does not
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to opt for free movement of workers. In this case, the short run cost of accepting
an excessive inﬂow of foreign workers in good states of nature does not outweigh the beneﬁt of the
migration option in bad states of nature.
We summarize our result in the following proposition. Let the set G(a;b;g) = f(a;b;g) :
G(a;b;g) < 1g. From the above discussion about the case g = 0, we know that this set is non-
empty.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that individuals are risk neutral and that countries face two-state anti-
correlated shocks. Consider a free labor mobility policy such that work permits are granted on the
condition of employment. Then, we get the following:
(i) The free labor mobility policy is not sustainable if (a;b;g) = 2 G(a;b;g) 6= / 0. Otherwise there
exists a discount factor d 2 (0;1) such that free migration policies are sustainable if d  d.
(ii) The free labor mobility policy is more likely to be sustainable as fewer goods are traded. It also is
more likely to be sustainable for intermediate values of local factor congestion.
In this subsection, we have analyzed the sustainability of free movement of workers under the
assumption of risk neutrality. Countries beneﬁt from a more efﬁcient spatial distribution of workers
in each state of nature. When individuals are risk averse, free movement of workers may also
provide insurance to individuals because it allows them to smooth incomes and consumptions through
relocation. We develop this idea in the following subsection.
4.2. Sustainability, insurance and labor ﬂexibility
When individuals are risk averse, the free movement of workers allows countries to smooth income
ﬂuctuation by pooling the risk of productivity shocks. This property becomes signiﬁcant as soon as
shocks are not perfectly positively correlated.
It is ﬁrstly interesting to study the case where individuals are inﬁnitely risk averse. In this case, for
any set of states, individuals take into account only the payoff in the worst state of nature they can
reach, say state s. It is then clear that the free movement of workers always improves consumption inSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 29
the worst state relative to the no mobility option. Thus, from condition (4), it can be seen that the
expected future gain is always positive so that there must be a large enough discount factor above
which free movement of workers becomes a sustainable policy.
The impact of risk aversion on the adopting free movement of workers can be made more precise
in the above context of the two-state anti-correlated shocks. Under risk aversion, the relative cost of
adopting (the policy of) free movement of workers becomes
G(a;b;g) 
u1(¯ L=2) u1(L1)
u2(L2) u2(¯ L=2)
;
where us(Ls) denotes the contemporaneous utilityU[Cs(Ls)].
Let us here review some polar cases when all goods are traded and when congestion is very strong
or very weak.
All trade When all goods are traded (g = 1), we know that the terms of trade fully absorb any
productivity differentials. Individuals therefore reach a constant utility and the function G(a) = 1.14
As before, free movement of workers is not useful and therefore it is not sustainable.
Strong congestion When congestion is very strong (b ! 0), the model works as if the world
supplied a ﬁxed amount of output that was asymmetrically divided across the countries. Although
free movement of workers offers no efﬁciency gain in labor markets, it allows countries to reach
an allocation of output closer (but not equal) to an even distribution of output. Free movement
of workers provides an (imperfect) insurance contract. As individuals become more risk averse
the expected beneﬁt of the policy, Esus(Ls) Esus(¯ L=2), increases compared to its short term cost,
us(¯ L=2) us(Ls). Therefore, the relative cost of adopting free movement of workers, G(a) < 1 and
there must exist discount factors for which free movement of workers is a sustainable policy.
14 We drop the notational dependence of G on b and g in what follows.SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 30
No congestion When there is no congestion and some tradeable goods (b = 1, g > 0), the relative
cost of adopting free movement of workers is G(a) = [U(a1 g) U(1)]=[U(1) U(ag 1)], which
is smaller than one if and only ifU(a1 g)+U(ag 1) < 2U(1). It can be shown that this is always
true for any utility function which has a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion greater than or equal one
for all relevant levels of consumption. As a consequence, when coefﬁcient relative risk aversion is
larger than one, there always exist discount factors d 2 (0;1) for which free movement of workers is
a sustainable policy.
We summarize these results in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that individuals are risk averse and that countries face two-state anti-
correlated shocks. Free movement of workers is never a sustainable policy in an economy with
only tradeable goods (g = 1). In an economy with either very low or very high congestion costs
(b 2 f0;1g), free movement of workers becomes a sustainable policy if and only if individuals are
sufﬁciently patient (high d).
Risk aversion has positive impact on the adoption of free movement of workers because it equalizes
consumption across countries and reduces the consumption variability across states of the worlds.
Risk aversion can also have important impact on the adoption of free movement of workers. To
illustrate this, we have plotted the sets of parameters (b;g) for which the relative cost of adopting
the free movement of workers, G(a) = 1 (solid lines in Figure 3a) and G(a) = 0:5 (dashed lines
in Figure 3b). The curves are drawn for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences with
relative risk aversion coefﬁcient r varying from 0 to 2. It is worth noting that for any relative risk
aversion coefﬁcient larger than one, the relative cost of adopting free movement of workers, G(a) < 1
everywhere except at the North and East borders of the ﬁgure. Therefore, for a constant relative risk
aversion coefﬁcient larger than one and for almost all parameters of the model (b;g), there always
exists a discount factor for which free movement of workers is a sustainable policy. Although we
have seen that the terms of trade eliminate the potential efﬁciency gains from a ﬂexible relocation
of workers, they do not eliminate the potential insurance gain caused by free movement of workers.
Empirical estimates of the coefﬁcient of constant risk aversion give values in a range between 2 and 5.SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 31
Therefore, Figure 3 suggests that risk sharing is an important element of the decision to adopt free
movement of workers.
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FIGURE 3: COST OF ADOPTING THE FREE LABOR MOBILITY POLICY UNDER RISK AVERSION.
To sum up, we have shown that free movement of workers is a sustainable policy for small enough
discount factors, for small enough trade levels and for intermediate local factor congestion. Risk
aversion is an important element in the decision to sustain free movements of workers.
5. FULL RIGHT MIGRATION POLICY
We now return to the distinction between non-permanent and permanent work program and between
rights for work permits and citizenship. In particular we now study another form of labor mobility
where individuals are automatically granted citizenship in the host country.
The policy of free movement of workers analyzed above is based on the distinction between
work permits and citizenship. Because guest workers have non-permanent work permits and have
no local citizenship, they are not included in the local government’s objective. In this section we
relax this distinction and assume that immigrants receive citizenship and the associated rights to
participate in the local labor market in a permanent way. This assumption addresses the situation
where economic shocks last longer than the civil integration (e.g. naturalization) of immigrants into
the host country. Indeed, in many countries, a long enough residence in a country allows migrantsSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 32
to acquire citizenship and therefore to get a permanent right to participate in the local labor market.
Similarly, the descendants of non-citizen migrants are often granted or allowed to ask the citizenship
of their parents’ host country, a right that allows them the right to participate in the local labor market.
Two examples for this setting can be found in the E.U. and the U.S. Under the Treaty of Lisbon,
E.U. citizens are allowed to get permanent work permit and resident cards in any E.U. member state
where they ﬁnd work while they keep their initial nationality and most of their political rights in
the native country. In E.U. countries, individuals may acquire the local nationality after a certain
amount of time and the local nationality can be asked for the descendants born on the local territories.
Similarly, the U.S. immigration services grant to foreign workers green cards that offer permanent
residence and access to labor market. As a step forward, the green cards give the opportunity to
apply for U.S. citizenship after a certain length of time. Descendants born in the U.S. automatically
acquire the U.S. citizenship. Therefore it is of interest to study the adoption of migration policy in
which immigrants get the same rights as local citizens and in which governments are concerned by
the welfare of both native and (naturalized) immigrant workers.
In this section we study the adoption of a full right migration policy by which, at the beginning of
each time period, immigrants get the full rights to citizenship and labor participation in the country
where they locate. Those rights include the political rights so that the welfare of both natives and
immigrants becomes the concerns of each government. In particular, we focus on the case where those
rights are acquired at the time of entry into the host country and where those rights are exclusive in
the sense that migrants loose their former citizenship and rights associated with their former nation.15
We ﬁnally keep the assumption that once the agreement about the policy is breached, it is breached for
ever. The full right migration policy includes two main differences with the policy of free movement
of workers considered above. First, when a country breaches from the full right migration policy, it is
indeed unwilling to reduce its work force because migrants are now part of its political constituency.
Secondly, because the number of nationals vary with shocks and related immigration ﬂows, the
initial distribution of nationals generally differs from the distributions of nationals in subsequent
15 In practice, such political rights may take some time to be acquired and may sometimes be cumulated over several
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time periods. As result, we must distinguish the acceptability and the sustainability of the full right
migration policy: acceptability relates to the decision to adopt the policy with the initial population
distribution whereas sustainability relates to the decision to continue (or not to breach) the policy
given the population distribution in subsequent time periods. We show that a full right migration
policy is less likely to adopted than the policy of free movement of workers.
Sustainability We ﬁrst focus on sustainability of the full right migration policy by assuming that
the policy is already agreed. Domestic labor market conditions are given by the number of domestic
citizens who have established residence in that country during the previous time period and who have
been granted citizenship and labor participation rights. If we denote by r and q 2 S the states of
nature in the current and previous time periods and by ur(Lr) the instantaneous utilityU[Cr(Lr)], the
full right migration policy is sustainable for the domestic country if and only
(7) ur(Lr)+
d
1 d
Esus(Ls)  ur(Lq)+
d
1 d
Esus(Lq) 8r;q 2 S;
where Lr and Lq are the short run equilibrium numbers of workers given by (3). This condition
is explained as it follows. The right hand side of this condition represents the domestic citizens’
intertemporal utility when their government breaches the policy agreement and keeps its Lq citizens.16
The left hand side of this condition represents the domestic citizens’ intertemporal utility under the
full rights migration policy. Because the citizens are allowed to move freely, they get the same
intertemporal utility in the next period irrespectively of the location they choose in the current
period; their current location decision thus depends only on the current state r and spatial labor
distribution Lr. As a result, the long run equilibrium coincides with the short run equilibrium where
us(Ls) = u
s(Ls). At the beginning of the current time period, the domestic government represents
only Lq citizens. Because of the possibility of relocation, those citizens get an intertemporal utility
equal to ur(Lr)+(d=(1 d))Esus(Ls).
Because domestic instantaneous utilities decrease with a larger domestic labor force, it follows that
Condition (7) is most stringent for state q  argminsLs and state r  argmaxr[ur(Lq) ur(Lr)]. The
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domestic country’s incentive to breach is the strongest (1) when it just recovers from the strongest
negative shock and has kept only a small share of its initial population and (2) when the short run
utility gain of restricting access to labor market in the current time period is the largest. In contrast to
the policy of free movement of workers, this puts a restriction on the set of shocks that make the full
right migration policy sustainable.
To get more insight we establish the following necessary condition. Let us take the expectation
of both sides of Condition (7) with respect to states r. Then Condition (7) implies that Esus(Ls) 
Esus(Lq). Therefore, the full right migration policy is sustainable only if there exists no state of nature
q 2 S such the latter inequality is not satisﬁed. Given our deﬁnition of q, this means that the full
right migration policy is sustainable only if
Esus(Ls)  Esus(Lq):
This puts an upper bound on the labor outﬂow the domestic country can tolerate: the full right
migration policy cannot be sustainable if the labor distribution is too uneven distributed in the
domestic country’s worst state of nature q. If it were, the country would be tempted to take advantage
of its small population share when its economy returns to good fortune and renege on the policy of
free migration.
It is also interesting to consider this necessary condition in the case of the two-state anti-correlated
shock that we have analyzed earlier (a1 = a
2 = a > 1, a2 = a
1 = 1=a < 0 and p1 = p2 = 1=2). In
this case the necessary condition simpliﬁes to u2(L2)  u1(L2), which contradicts the property of the
shock symmetry, u2(L2) = u1(L1), and the fact that u1(L1) < u1(L2) because L1 > L2. The full rights
migration policy is thus not sustainable. We summarize this discussion in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5: Consider a full right migration policy such that immigrants get citizenship in the
host country.
(i) This policy is sustainable if and only Condition (7) holds for q = q  argminsLs and r = r 
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(ii) The policy is never sustainable if Esus(Ls) < Esus(Lq).
(iii) The policy is never sustainable in the case of two-state anti-correlated shocks.
Adoption The previous discussion focused on the sustainability of the full right migration policy by
assuming that the policy was already agreed. We now analyze the issue of the adoption of the policy
in the initial time period where population distributions are not the result of free labor movements. In
line with the previous section, we suppose that the spatial distribution is initially given by (¯ L=2; ¯ L=2).
Let the state in the initial time period be denoted by r0. So, the full right migration policy is adopted
in the initial time period if and only if Condition (7) holds and if the following adoption condition
(8) ur0(Lr0)+
d
1 d
Esus(Ls)  ur(¯ L=2)+
d
1 d
Esus(¯ L=2)
holds. The adoption condition is obvious the counter part of Condition (4) where r is replaced by
r0. It compares the intertemporal utility of a representative citizen under free labor mobility with
his/her intertemporal utility when its government maintains the population at its initial distribution by
allowing no migration. Because ¯ L=2  Lq, the right hand side of this condition is smaller than the
right hand side of Condition (7). Because this is true for any r0, the adoption condition is implied
by Condition (7). Therefore, if Condition (7) holds and countries are initially evenly distributed, the
domestic country adopts the full right migration policy for any initial state of nature. By the same
token we have proven that Condition (7) is stronger than Condition (4). This means that a policy of
free movement of workers is always sustainable if the full right migration policy is adopted.
We summarize our discussion in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 6: Consider a full right migration policy such that immigrants get citizenship in
the host country. Then, a full right migration policy will be both adopted and sustainable under the
conditions of Proposition 5 if initially the population is evenly distributed. The full right migration
policy is less likely to be adopted than the policy of free movement of workers.
The main message of this discussion is that a full right migration policy is less likely to be adopted
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of the two countries when they face (strong) productivity changes. When the domestic country had
low productivity in the previous period and currently experiences a strong rise in its productivity, it
has the option to breach the full right migration policy and restrict the beneﬁt of the productivity rise
to its local citizens. As a result, the foreign country is unable to offer its citizens the option to move, a
situation that is particularly critical when it faces a sudden negative productivity shock at the same
time. The harm to the foreign country is greater in the case of a full right migration policy compared
to a policy of free movement of workers because it cannot restrict work participation to just the initial
¯ L=2 workers. Hence, we conclude that the fall-back position of countries with respect to citizenship
and rights to local labor market participation is an important element of sustainability and adoption of
labor mobility policies.
6. EXTENSIONS
Our model can be extended in many directions. We here investigate two effects on the adoption
of migration policies: the effect of productivity asymmetries between countries and that of unem-
ployment. For the sake of conciseness, we focus on the policy of free movement of workers. By
Proposition 6, the full right migration policy will not be adopted if free movement of workers is not a
sustainable policy.
6.1. Country asymmetries
The above discussion suggests that there exist good economic rationales to permit labor ﬂows
between countries when the latter face productivity shocks which are not perfectly correlated. Yet, it
is readily observed that free labor ﬂows are neither organized nor permitted between many countries
of the world. This is particularly true for labor ﬂows between developing and developed countries. As
a case in point, the TN status, which offers permission to work within the U.S. under the N.A.F.T.A.,
has been subject to huge restrictions for Mexican natives whereas it has included very few restrictions
for Canadians. The higher reluctance of developed countries to migration ﬂows from less developed
countries is usually explained by their concerns about a possible direct redistribution towards the
immigrants (e.g. Ortega 2010, Wellisch and Walz 1998). In this section we provide an explanationSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 37
without such direct redistribution. We show that large productivity differences make labor mobility
policies less sustainable.
To make the argument simple, suppose that agents have an instantaneous utility given by the CRRA
utility function,U(C)=C1 r=(1 r), r 0 and r 6=1. Suppose further the domestic productivity is
now given by e as  qas, whereas the foreign productivity remains equal to a
s , s 2 S. The parameter
q (q  1) measures the domestic productivity advantage. Then, the equilibrium distribution of labor
under free labor mobility is given by
e Ls
e L
s
=

e as
a
s
 1 g
1 b(1 g)
=

qas
a
s
 1 g
1 b(1 g)
=
Ls
L
s

q
1 g
1 b(1 g)

;
wherethetildeedenotesthenewvariablesundercountryasymmetry. Onecancomputethatde Ls=dq >0
so that e Ls > Ls;8s 2 S. As a result, a higher productivity advantage yields a stronger incentive to
agglomerate in the domestic country. This is true for any state of nature. Also, it can be checked that
employment levels are ranked in the same order as in the case where q = 1. So, Ls > Lr () e Ls > e Lr,
r 6= s. Because of the CRRA preferences for risk, the instantaneous utility is
e us(e Ls) =U

(qas)
1 
g
2 (a
s )
g
2

e Ls
b(1 
g
2) 1
e L
s
b
g
2

= us(e Ls)

q(1 
g
2)(1 r)

:
Following the same argument as for Condition (4), we can state that free movement of workers is a
sustainable policy for the domestic country if and only if
d
1 d

e us(L=2) e us(e Ls)
Ese us(e Ls) Ese u(¯ L=2)
;
which is equivalent to
(9)
d
1 d

us(¯ L=2) us(e Ls)
Esus(e Ls) Esus(¯ L=2)
:
Condition (9) is the same as Condition (4) except that the variables of domestic employment Ls
have been replaced by e Ls. The critical state s is the same as before. Indeed, one can check that s,SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 38
deﬁned as argmaxr fe ur(¯ L=2) e ur(e Lr)g, is equal to argmaxrfur(L=2) ur(e Lr)g and equivalently to
argmaxrfur(¯ L=2) ur(Lr)g since e Lr >Lr, 8r 2S. Because instantaneous utility ur(Lr) is decreasing
in Lr, the employment levels e Ls increase and the domestic country’s instantaneous utility falls in any
state of nature as country asymmetries rise (larger q). As a result, the numerator of the right hand
side of Condition (9) increases whereas its denominator decreases, so that the ratio increases. The
critical discount factor for which Condition (9) binds is then larger than the critical factor d for which
Condition (4) binds. Free movement of workers is therefore less likely to be a sustainable policy
when country asymmetries become more important.
PROPOSITION 7: Suppose that individuals have CRRA preferences and that the domestic country’s
productivity increases relative to the foreign country such that q satisﬁes e as  qas (q  1). Then,
the free labor mobility policy is less likely to be sustainable the lager is domestic country’s advantage
(the larger q).
This proposition provides some support to the idea that developed countries are unlikely to accept
uncontrolled inﬂows of immigrants from developing countries. Although there exist gains from a
more efﬁcient distribution of labor and from a possible insurance mechanism, the high productivity
country does not accept a policy of free movement of workers because such policy would lead to a
large and permanent spatial redistribution of workers. Such a redistribution of workers increases the
congestion of local factors and reduces the domestic residents’ wage and consumption. One can get a
very clear idea about this effect when q is very large. If q is large enough, the number of workers in
the home country under free movement of workers, e Ls, is larger than the number of citizens, ¯ L=2, for
any state of nature. The home instantaneous utility levels are smaller with the policy than without it
and the home country will ﬁnd the policy unacceptable.
The present discussion is not unrelated to the discussion about the full right migration policy. The
latter policy is not sustainable when a country inherits from the previous time period a population that
is small compared to the population that would be desired by the social planner. Here, the advantaged
country also inherits from the initial time period a population (¯ L=2) that is small compared to the
social planner’s current choice of population. As a result, both policies offer no improvement to the
country with the (temporary or permanent) advantage.SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 39
6.2. Unemployment
The reluctance to opt for free movement of workers is often based on a claim about local labor
market problems. In particular, many countries have found it difﬁcult to allow uncontrolled (in)ﬂows
of workers in times of high unemployment. Boeri and Brücker (2005) presents evidence of the
hardening of migration conditions within the E.U. This being most evident for richer countries
with large unemployment levels, such as France and Belgium. We here show that the existence of
unemployment stemming from labor market rigidities is not a rationale against the adoption of free
movement of workers.
Unemployment generally stems from some form of downward nominal wage rigidities. For the
sake of simplicity, let us suppose that the domestic and foreign wages (w;w) must lie above some
exogenous minimum wage w. Let the tuple (L;L) denote the domestic and foreign populations and
let the tuple (l;l) denote the numbers of worked hours or employed workers; the tuple (L l;L l)
can be interpreted as either under-employment or unemployment. In the latter case, we make the
simplifying assumption that governments follow a Rawlsian welfare objective and implement lump
sum redistribution to the unemployed so that employed and unemployed workers residing in a same
country get the same utility. The analysis of the short run equilibrium is the same as in Section 3 except
that (L;L) must be replaced by (l;l). The wage ratio equality (1) now gives the employment ratio:
l=l = w=w. This states that worked hours follow local costs of labor. The domestic instantaneous
utility is now given by:
U (C) =U
h
a1 g=2(a)
g=2(l)
b(1 g=2)(l)
bg=2L 1
i
=U
h
a1 g=2(a)
g=2(w=w)
bg=2lbL 1
i
:
A symmetric expression holds for the foreign country.
Suppose now that the domestic country faces a good productivity shock relative to the foreign
country: a > a. Then, if labor is immobile and if the minimum wage w is high enough, downward
wage rigidities imply that the foreign country faces unemployment (w = w and l < L) whereas theSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 40
domestic country has full employment (w  w and l = L). The instantaneous utilities are given by:
U (C) =U
h
a1 g=2(a)
g=2(w=w)
bg=2Lb 1
i
and
U (C) =U
h
(a)
1 g=2(a)
g=2(w=w)
bg=2(l=L)
b (L)
b 1
i
:
By contrast, when labor is allowed to move across countries, foreign workers move to the domestic
country as long asC=C > 1; that is, if (a=a)1 g(w=w)bg(l=L) b(L=L)b 1 > 1. So, L increases
whereas L decreases to l. At this point, the foreign country reaches full employment; the labor
distribution reaches the short run equilibrium distribution (3) that is obtained in Section 3. Therefore,
free movement of workers eliminates unemployment. Free movement of workers implies a better use
of productive resources in terms of both time and spatial allocation of work. Workers then get the
same instantaneous utility levels us(Ls) as those deﬁned in Section 3.
Let us now deﬁne the instantaneous utilities as us(L=2) when countries do not adopt or breach the
policy of free movement of workers. Note that labor market rigidities imply that us(Ls) < us(Ls) for
all Ls, s 2 S. Following the same argument as for Condition (4), we can state that free movement of
workers is a sustainable policy for the domestic country if and only if
d
1 d

us(¯ L=2) us(Ls)
Esus(Ls) Esus(¯ L=2)
:
Since us(Ls) < us(Ls), the right hand side in this condition is smaller than in Condition (4). The free
movement of workers is therefore more likely to be a sustainable policy when countries face wages
rigidities.
PROPOSITION 8: The free labor mobility policy is more likely to be sustainable when countries
face downward wages rigidities and unemployment.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied the factors that help countries mutually agree common policies of
free movement of workers. For the countries to agree on such a common policy, short run costs
must be outweighed by long term beneﬁts. Under free movement of workers, countries facing goodSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 41
productivity shocks incur short run costs as they allow foreign workers to participate in their local
labor markets, which reduces local wages and/or purchasing power. By contrast, countries facing
bad productivity shocks beneﬁt from free movement of workers because they are able to invite their
citizens to work temporarily or permanently in more prosperous countries. When productivity varies
through time, free migration policies therefore bring long run beneﬁts in terms of labor market
ﬂexibility and income risk sharing.
We considered the economic factors that contribute to the mutual agreement to adopt a policy of
free movement of workers. We showed that free movement of workers creates negative externalities
on local workers when countries produce some tradeable goods. This externality yields excess
agglomeration of labor in the most productive country (which is exacerbated under weak congestion).
This externality reduces the incentives of both countries to adopt a common policy for free movement
of workers. Also, we showed that, from the view point of labor market efﬁciency alone, free movement
of workers cannot be a sustainable policy in an economy with only tradeable goods or with very high
congestion factors (strong decreasing returns to scale). In general, free migration policies become
sustainable only if the share of tradeable goods is not too large and congestion factors are neither too
high nor to small. In fact, some congestion factors can help. This reverses the conventional wisdom
that congestion costs tend to reduce the political acceptability of migration.
We distinguished between two main policies. Under the policy of free movement of workers,
migrants are guest workers who receive non-permanent work and residence permits. This policy
corresponds to third-country association agreements or usual guest worker programs. Under the
full right migration policy, migrants receive permanent work and residence permits as well as local
political rights. Such a policy corresponds to a policy of naturalization of migrants or their descendants.
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the latter policy is less likely to be sustainable. This is
because each country anticipates the problem that may arise when its productivity falls: it may be
stuck with too a large (recently naturalized) population and face other countries that block any reverse
migration ﬂow by breaching the full right migration agreement.
We considered the case of permanent productivity differences and showed how this factor may
explain the reluctance of developed countries to accept uncontrolled inﬂows of immigrants fromSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 42
developing countries. The analysis was also extended to a simple case with unemployment caused
by wage rigidities to show that free labor mobility policies are more likely to be sustainable when
countries face downward rigidities in wages.
The analysis could also be extended in several other directions. For instance, it will be interesting
to investigate the acceptability of policies of free movement of workers in the case of heterogeneous
workers, public ﬁnance issues, controlled migration, etc. These issues are left for further research.
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APPENDIX A.
This appendix derives the short run market equilibrium of Section 3. We proceed in four steps.
First, because proﬁts are redistributed locally we have that national incomeY is equal to the value of
domestic production PXX +PZZ where Pi is the price of good in sector i. Second we calculate labor
demand from the condition that the value of the marginal product equals the wage rate, PiF0
i (Li) = w,
or equivalently, PiabL
b 1
i =w. This implies that the value of production in each sector is proportional
to the wage bill: PiF(Li) = b 1wLi. The national income in wage units is then equal toY = b 1wL.
Third, given the Cobb-Douglas preference individuals spend a share g=2 of their income on each
of the tradeable goods and a share 1 g on the local non-tradeable good. So, the goods market
clearing condition in the non-tradeable sector gives b 1wLZ = (1 g)Y and hence LZ = (1 g)L
since Y = b 1wL. Then using the labor market clearing condition in the domestic market we have
that LX = gL. We can further use these conditions to compute the price of tradeable and non-
tradeable goods in wage units as PX = (ab) 1(gL)1 bw and PZ = (ab) 1[(1 g)L]1 bw. Finally,
we consider the market clearing conditions for the tradeable good sectors in the domestic and foreign
countries. With the Cobb-Douglas preference the value of production is equal to the consumers’
expenditure shares: PXFX(LX)=(g=2)(Y +Y) and P
XF
X(L
X)=(g=2)(Y+Y). Therefore, the valueSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 46
of production of the tradeable good is the same in both countries: PXFX(LX) = P
XF
X(L
X). Because
the value of production in each sector is proportional to the wage bill (with proportion b) the wage
bills in each country in the tradeable sectors must be equal: wLi = wL
i . This then further applies to
the non-tradeable sector and hence the equilibrium ratio of wages is w=w = L=L.
APPENDIX B.
We consider a rudimentary model of moving costs. The aim is to show that the assumption of
zero moving costs in the main body of the paper can be relaxed provided moving costs are not too
high on average. To do this requires two elements. First we assume that a moving cost of m is
equivalent to a reduction in consumption. Suppose that consumption in the home country is higher
than consumption in the foreign country when there are L  ¯ L=2, C(L) >C(L). A foreign worker
will move if U(C(L) m) U(C(L)) or m C(L) C(L). Second assume that moving costs are
heterogeneous across workers and that the distribution of moving costs across workers is a negative
exponential distribution with an average moving cost of ¯ m. That is the distribution of moving costs is
given by the cumulative distribution function F(m) = 1 exp( m=¯ m). This distribution is convenient
as there are always some workers with low moving costs and because the distribution is described
simply by its mean. Other assumptions on the distribution of moving costs could be made but the
exponential is particularly analytically convenient. Using the exponential distribution, the number of
foreign workers with moving costs less than or equal toC(L) C(L) is
(¯ L=2)F(C(L) C(L)) = (¯ L=2)(1 exp( (C(L) C(L))=¯ m)):
For there to be an equilibrium in which C(L) and C(L) are equated, this number of workers should
be no less that ˆ L L where ˆ L is the equilibrium labor force and L 2 [¯ L=2; ˆ L). That is
(¯ L=2)(1 exp( (C(L) C(L))=¯ m))  ˆ L L
for L 2 [¯ L=2; ˆ L). If this inequality is satisﬁed then for any L 2 [¯ L=2; ˆ L) there are always enough
workers prepared to move such that consumption is equated in the two countries. Rewriting thisSUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES 47
inequality gives
¯ m 
(C(L) C(L))
 log

1 

ˆ L L
¯ L
2

for L 2 [¯ L=2; ˆ L). Note that the term on the right-hand-side is positive and bounded above. To see
it is positive, note that C(L) >C(L) by assumption and the term inside the logarithm is less than
one. It is bounded above for L 2 [¯ L=2; ˆ L). In the limit as L ! ˆ L both the numerator and denominator
vanish, but using L’Hospital’s rule it can be shown that the limit as L ! ˆ L is positive and ﬁnite. Thus
provided the average moving cost is not too high, and assuming a similar condition holds for Home
workers considering migration to the Foreign country, the equilibrium allocation with moving costs
will be the same as when moving costs are zero. The welfare properties will however, be different.
APPENDIX C.
This appendix derives the necessary conditions for the planner’s optimization problem. The planner
maximizes world per-capita welfareW(L) = w(L)C(L)+(1 w(L))C(L) where w(L) = L=¯ L. It is
easy to check that
C0(L) =

b

1 
g
2

 1
C(L)
L
 
bg
2
C(L)
¯ L L
with a similar expression forC0(L). It then follows that
W0(L) =
bC(L)
¯ L

1 
g
2
 
g
2

L
L

 
C(L)
C(L)

1 
g
2
 
g
2

L
L

:
The planner’s optimal labor allocation ˜ L solvesW0(˜ L) = 0 and is given by
C(˜ L)
C(˜ L)
=
 
1 (g=2) (g=2)(˜ L=˜ L)

 
1 (g=2) (g=2)(˜ L=˜ L)
:
Under free movement of workers, we haveC(ˆ L) =C(ˆ L) so that:
W0(ˆ L) =
bC(ˆ L)
¯ L
g
2
 ˆ L
ˆ L
 
ˆ L
ˆ L

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Likewise, we can check whether the social planner prefers to allocate more labor to the more
productive country. Since at L = ¯ L=2,C(¯ L=2)=C(¯ L=2) = (a=a)(1 g) we have
W0(¯ L=2) =
bC(¯ L=2)
¯ L
(1 g)

1 
C(¯ L=2)
C(¯ L=2)

=
bC(¯ L=2)
¯ L
(1 g)
"
1 

a
a
(1 g)#
: